The legislatures first time recognize the power of the Tribunal to stay demand legislature by insertion of Section 253 (7) which provided for levy of fees on application for stay of demand. Prior to this insertion, the power of the Appellate Tribunal to grant stay was held to be incidental or ancillary to its appellate jurisdiction. Stay was granted in most deserving and appropriate cases where the tribunal was satisfied that the entire purpose of the appeal will be frustrated or rendered nugatory by allowing the recovery proceedings to continue during the pendency of the appeal.
Thereafter, two provisos were inserted in sub section
254(2A) by Finance
Act, 2001, which
provided that where
stay is granted in any proceedings, the Appellate Tribunal
shall dispose of the appeal
within a period
of 180 days from the date of
such order. Further, if such appeal is not so disposed of within the period of
180 days the stay order shall
stand vacated after the expiry
of the said period.
These two provisos were substituted with
three provisos by Finance Act, 2007, which gave the Tribunal the power to extend
the stay up to 365 days provided
the delay in disposal of appeal was not attributable to assessee and the appeal is disposed of within the
extended period. Third proviso provided that if such appeal is not so disposed
of within the extended period
of 365 days the stay order shall stand vacated
after the expiry
of the said period.
At this stage, the question
arose whether the third proviso
has curtailed the powers of the Tribunal
to grant the stay beyond
365 days, even if the delay in disposal of appeal was not attributable to the assessee.
Hon'ble Bombay High Court in Narang Overseas (P.) Ltd. v. Income-tax Appellate Tribunal 165 Taxmann
557 read down the third proviso of Section 254(2A) of the Act as amended by
the 2007 Act which purported to
curtail the power of the Tribunal to grant or continue an order of stay beyond
the prescribed period where the
appeal was not disposed of within such period, in cases where the delay in
disposal of the appeal was in no way
attributable to the assessee. Thus, there would be power in the Tribunal to
extend the period of stay on good cause
being shown and on the Tribunal being satisfied that the matter
could not be heard and disposed of for reasons
not attributable to the assessee.
To overrule the judgment in Narang
Overseas (P.) Ltd.'s case (supra),
third proviso was substituted by Finance Act, 2008 and the substituted provision provided
that the stay cannot be granted beyond 365 days even if the delay in disposal
of the appeal is not attributable to the assessee.
The substituted provision came up for
consideration before Hon'ble Delhi High Court in CIT v. Maruti Suzuki (India) Ltd. 44 Taxmann 166 and court,
without examining the constitutional validity of third proviso, held that Tribunal does not have power to grant
stay beyond 365 days, but assessee can file writ petition in the High Court for stay and the High Court has the
power and jurisdiction to grant stay and issue
directions to the tribunal as may be required including granting stay of recovery.
The constitutional validity of the third
proviso was examined by Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the case of Pepsi Foods
(P.) Ltd. v. Asstt. CIT 57 Taxmann
337 where the phrase, "even if
the delay in disposing of the appeal
is not attributable to the assessee" was struck down by court on the
ground being violative of the non- discrimination clause
of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
The first proviso was again amended by
Finance Act, 2020 with effect from 1-4-2020 to provide that Tribunal can grant stay subject to the condition
that the assessee deposits not less than 20% of the amount of tax, interest, fee, penalty, or any other sum
payable under the provisions of this Act or furnishes security of equal amount in respect
thereof. Thus, the tribunal can no longer grant stay for entire disputed
amount. Assessees will have to approach High Court under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India if they wish to have stay for entire disputed
amount.
The second proviso was also amended by
Finance Act, 2020 with effect from 1-4-2020. The proviso has now been negatively worded and, also substituting the word 'may' with 'shall'.
By this substitution, the power of the tribunal has been curtailed and inherent power of granting
the stay beyond
365 days even in deserving
cases has been taken away. This amendment has been
done to overrule various rulings which provided that extension beyond 365 days can be granted if the delay
is not attributable to the assessee.
Striking down of the third proviso
by Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the case of Pepsi Foods (P.) Ltd.(supra)
was subject matter of challenge
before Hon'ble Supreme
Court in Dy. CIT v. Pepsi Foods Ltd.
126 Taxmann 169 and the court decided on 6-4-2021 that
the third proviso to Section 254 (2A) of the
Income-tax Act will now be read without the word "even" and
the words "is not" after the words "delay in disposing
of the appeal". Any order of stay shall stand vacated after the expiry of the period or periods
mentioned in the Section only if the delay in disposing
of the appeal is attributable to the assessee.
Thus, the
ratio decidendi of the Hon'ble
Delhi High Court has now been affirmed
by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
Striking down of third proviso by Hon'ble
Delhi High Court had limited applicability due to its decision being binding
only on the lower authorities falling under its jurisdiction. However,
the judgement of Hon'ble Supreme
Court has brought a great relief to the sincere taxpayers in whose case
the extension beyond 365 days can now be granted
by tribunals itself
and they need not approach
high courts.
Conclusion:
By restricting the stay period to 365
days for all assessee, un-equals have been treated equally. Assessees who, after having obtained stay orders and by
their conduct delay the appeal proceedings, have been treated in the same manner in which assessees, who have
not, in any way, delayed the proceedings in the appeal. The two classes
of assessees are distinct and cannot be treated equally.
Filing writ petition with High Court for
grant of stay would have not only led to multiplicity of proceedings before the High Court but also had increased the litigation cost for assessees.
Restriction on the stay period so that
appeals are heard expeditiously and that assesses do not misuse the stay orders granted in their favour by
adopting delaying tactics was not at all achieved by these provisos. By these provisos' assessee
were being punished for matters which may be completely beyond their control.
Indeed, there can be numerous reasons and causes where appeals may not get finally decided
within 365 days and extension beyond prescribed period was imperative.
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