THE issues before the Bench are - Whether booking rights or
rights to purchase the apartment or rights to obtain title to the apartment are
also capital assets that is transferable; Whether the booking rights to a
property sold can accrue to the assessee on the date of application for
allotment/confirmation of allotment; Whether in case there is no intention of
the builder of the property to convey any rights to the assessee, it can be
assumed that "booking rights" emanated from the confirmation letter given by the
said builder and Whether in such case the date of execution of the agreement to
sell by the assessee to a subsequent buyer would be considered as the date of
transfer of "Booking Rights". And the verdict goes against the
assessee.
Facts of the
case
Before HC, assessee's counsel had
submitted that by way of application dated 31.7.2004 for allotment and payment
of the booking amount, assessee had acquired the "right to purchase the
property"/booking rights, which were extinguished by execution of the agreement
to sell dated 2.11.2007 in favour of buyer, thus making his booking rights a
LTCG, held for a period of 39 months and 2 days. Alternatively, the it had
submitted placing reliance on CIT v. Ved Parkash and Sons (HUF), [1994] 207
ITR 148 that rights in the apartment were acquired on the date of receipt
of allotment letter i.e. 6.8.2004, by which the apartment was provisionally
allotted to him, which rights were sold on 2.11.2007 thus making his right in
the apartment a LTCG. The two grounds for this submission were first, that
Section 2(47), which defines “transfer” in relation to a capital asset, is a
wide and inclusive definition that encompasses even transfer of a right in
property, thus including within its ambit, transfer of booking rights, second,
that a combined reading of Sections 2(14) and 2(47) show that transfer of a
capital asset is not restricted to transfer of ownership in immovable property
alone. On the other hand, the Revenue's counsel had relied on the order of the
ITAT member who held that booking rights accrued in the assessee only once the
buyer’s agreement of 4.11.2004 was signed, thus making the profits from sale
taxable as short-term capital gains.
Held
that,
++ it
is clear that a “capital asset” under the Act is property of “any kind” that is
“held” by the assessee. Necessarily, a capital asset must be transferable. Thus,
to understand what kind of property can be considered a capital asset, it would
be apposite to refer to the definition of transfer in Section 2(47) of the Act.
Section 2(47)(v) and (vi), and Explanation 2 make it adequately clear that
possession, enjoyment of immovable property, as well as an interest in any asset
are all transferable “capital assets”. The reference to acquisition “by way of
any agreement or any arrangement or in any other manner whatsoever” establishes
that it is not conveyance of property or the doctrine of part performance which
result in enforceable rights, for the purposes of the Income Tax. The
scheme of the Act puts it beyond doubt that even rights or interests in a
property are kinds of property that are transferable capital assets. Thus, there
is no doubt that booking rights or rights to purchase the apartment or rights to
obtain title to the apartment are also capital assets that can be transferable.
However, even while this Court agrees with the submissions of the assessee, it
is pertinent to note that this question does not arise in these facts. Neither
the CIT-A nor the ITAT have held that a capital asset can only be title
to/ownership of the apartment. The order of the CIT-A locates the source of the
booking rights i.e. date of acquisition of capital asset as the buyer’s
agreement dated 4.11.2004, which finding is subsequently confirmed by the ITAT
by additionally relying on the receipts at the time of confirmation of
allotment. Thus, in these facts, the question of whether the booking rights are
a transferable capital asset is not contentious. The judgment in Ved Parkash is
also consequently of no assistance in this matter since the reasoning therein
turns on whether “capital asset” refers only to title to property as opposed to
other rights/interests in the property;
++
the only question that arises for consideration is whether the booking rights to
the apartment accrued to the assessee on the date of application for
allotment/confirmation of allotment or on the date of execution of the agreement
to sell i.e. the buyer’s agreement. This Court is of the opinion that a right or
interest in an immovable property can accrue only by way of an agreement
embodying consensus ad idem. The nature of the right sought to be transferred
here is the right to purchase the apartment and obtain title, termed “booking
rights”. Only that agreement which intends to convey these rights according to
both parties can be considered as the source of accrual of rights to the
assessee. The confirmation letter dated 6.8.2004 specifically states first, that
no right to provisional/final allotment accrues until the Buyer’s Agreement is
signed and returned to the builders and second, that no right to claim
title/ownership results from the confirmation letter itself. Thus, it is clear
that the Builders do not intend to convey any right of provisional/final
allotment or any right to claim title/ownership under the confirmation letter.
There being no intention to convey rights in this document, it would be
impermissible for this Court to find that the right to obtain title/ "booking
rights" emanated from the confirmation letter. These rights may only be located
in the Buyer’s agreement, and thus, the date of acquisition of the capital asset
must be considered the date of signing of said agreement i.e. 4.11.2004 These
rights were transferred by the assessee on 2.11.2007. Thus, this Court is of the
opinion that the capital asset in the form of these rights was held for a period
of 35 months and 28 days, i.e. a short-term capital asset thus rendering the
profits from the transfer of this capital asset taxable as short-term capital
gains;
++ in
Ved Parkash, the assessee sought to claim that the date of acquisition of the
capital asset was the date of entering into the agreement to sell with the
builder, by which the assessee had also received possession of the property. The
Department, on the other hand, claimed that according to the conditions of the
agreement, no right, title or interest in the property would be conveyed to the
assessee until all instalments due and payable under that agreement were
completed. It was also sought to be argued that the assessee became the
titleholder to the property only once all the instalments were paid, and that
title to the property was the only capital asset that could be transferred. It
was in the context of these arguments that the Court held first,that it is
incorrect to say that the assessee had no right or interest in the property
until the completion of payment of all instalments under the agreement as the
assessee was a beneficial owner from the date of signing the agreement, having
been put in possession of the property as of that date and second, that Section
2(42A) of the Act, in any event only uses the term “held” and not “owned”, thus
indicating that a capital asset need not only refer to full title over any
property. Ved Parkash can thus be distinguished on two grounds, first, that in
the instant matter, booking rights are sought to be sourced in the allotment
application/confirmation letter and not in an agreement to sell, second, no
right of possession or similar beneficial interest was conveyed to the assessee
in the instant case when the application for allotment was made/confirmation
letter was received. The agreement to sell was considered to be the source of a
beneficial interest to the assessee in Ved Parkash only because the right of
possession had been transferred to the assessee along with the agreement to
sell. There cannot be any parity between the allotment application/confirmation
letter in the instant case and the agreement to sell in Ved Parkash, since the
confirmation letter specifically states that no right of provisional
allotment/final allotment will result from it to the assessee. This Court is
thus of the opinion that there is no legal infirmity in the order of the ITAT.
The appeal is thus dismissed along with pending applications.
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